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THE POLITICAL AND CULTURAL UNDERPINNINGS OF 
ATLANTICISM’S CRISIS IN THE 1960S
Kenneth Weisbrode
The term “Atlantic Community” was introduced in the early twentieth 
century by the American journalists Walter Lippmann and Clarence 
Streit.1 It referred to a union of people and cultures, not solely of 
states.2 The deﬁ nition was an ecumenical one, combining a demo-
cratic concept of society with an alliance of the nations of Europe and 
North America. Atlanticists, as they came to be called, portrayed the 
Atlantic Community as the core area of “the West.” This was consistent 
with the world-historical — also called the civilizational — concept, 
which joined North America (usually without Mexico) and Europe 
into a single entity: no longer merely the Old and the New World, 
but instead a united Western civilization.
Expressions of mental geography, like most concepts, are possible 
to historicize and reconstruct. If some regionalisms do in fact rise, 
decline, and die, then when, why, and how? A critical reconstruction of 
their history calls for a process that examines the structure and norms 
of transnational society by way of its rhetoric, cultural trends, fashions, 
and, ﬁ nally, its politics over time. Atlanticism has a particular trajec-
tory, which relates to American Cold War hegemony and to the role of 
Europeans in the discursive construction of the West. Yet the outline 
of its life cycle is longer, dating back to the “invention” of America by 
Europeans in the early modern period, followed by the reciprocal (or 
derivative, depending on where one lived) invention of New World 
ideology.3 By the end of the nineteenth century, a reinvented Atlantic 
concept had begun to overtake its rivals, namely Americanism, or the 
idea that the New World is inherently distinct and diff erent from the 
Old. “Transatlantic,” “cis-Atlantic,” and “circum-Atlantic,” to cite the 
terms used by David Armitage to describe contending deﬁ nitions of the 
Atlantic world in the earlier period, had begun to merge into a single 
“Atlantic” culture.4 That shift , in turn, reﬂ ected and encouraged a more 
overt and active political role for the United States in European aff airs, 
reversing a tenet of American politics dating back to Washington’s 
Farewell Address. The political shift , in turn, encouraged a social 
convergence across the Atlantic, as the number of Atlanticists — from 
bankers and diplomats to artists — multiplied so that by mid-century it 
became possible for a prominent writer like Lippmann to acknowledge 
the fact of an Atlantic Community.
1   This essay is based on my 
longer study, The Atlan-
tic Century (Cambridge, 
MA, 2009). I am grateful 
for the comments of Jan 
Logemann, Mary Nolan, 
Lauren Shaw, and Casey 
Sutcliff e, as well as to fel-
low members of the Oslo 
Contemporary Interna-
tional History Workshop, 
especially Klaus Petersen, 
Helge Pharo, and 
Katharina Rietzler. 
2   Walter Lippmann, U.S. 
Foreign Policy: Shield of the 
Republic (Boston, 1943); 
Clarence Streit, Union Now 
(New York, 1939); Ronald 
Steel, “Walter Lippmann 
and the Invention of the 
Atlantic Community,” 
in European Community, 
Atlantic Community?, ed. 
Valérie Aubourg, Gérard 
Bossuat, and Giles Scott-
Smith (Paris, 2008).
3   See J. H. Elliott’s interpre-
tation in The Old World 
and the New, 1492-1650 
(Cambridge, UK, 1970).
4   David Armitage, “Three 
Concepts of Atlantic His-
tory,” in The British Atlan-
tic World, 1500-1800, 
ed. Armitage and Michael 
J. Braddick (New York, 
2002), 11-27.
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By the interwar period it is possible to identify a conﬂ uence of six 
structural and cultural factors: A resurgence of nationalism in the 
United States vis-à-vis Europe alongside a recognition of American 
“civilization”; a progressive-era exchange of professional standards of 
public administration, including diplomacy, in most major European 
powers and in the United States; a shift  toward collectivist, meliorist, 
and, for some, messianic thinking on both sides of the Atlantic; a 
related shift  in the political sphere, resulting in the ideology of col-
lective security; a political crisis within Europe and between Europe 
and its colonies; and an assertion of American economic and political 
inﬂ uence in both places. For Americans, this result had to do with 
the country’s rise to globalism in a Eurocentric world; for Europeans, 
it meant keeping up with American “progress.” For some of both, it 
meant coming to realize that they and their societies were, or ought 
to be, more alike than diff erent. But little of that could have happened 
on its own. Atlanticism needed empire builders as well as mediators: 
diplomats, merchants, investors, social entrepreneurs, cultural role 
models, and similar transnational actors — not only political ﬁ gures 
but also other celebrities, from the patrons of literary salons to the 
ﬁ lm stars with their “mid-Atlantic” accents.
Tracing this trajectory is important for assigning historical signiﬁ -
cance to the variety, texture, and tone of Atlantic crossings that took 
place later in the twentieth century. Atlanticism varied by place and 
generation, as did the intensity of its expression. Its post-World War 
II apotheosis rested on older, diverse foundations. It was promoted by 
members of a self-identifying transatlantic elite to be sure, but it was 
not restricted to them, as the other essays in this issue show. People 
from many backgrounds who called themselves Atlanticists sought 
greater transnational solidarity. The bonds that held them together 
resulted as much from cultural empathy as from the demands of war 
and peace. That would appear obvious from their rhetoric. But alliances 
and allegiances were also complicated, and in some cases — as with 
the debate over partnership in the 1960s, described below — Atlanticists 
also appeared more preoccupied with diff erentiating themselves from 
one another than with promoting common transnational positions. 
This was not an inevitable source of weakness but became one by the 
middle 1960s when other factors — namely the stabilization of the Cold 
War in Europe and its destabilization vis-à-vis the rest of the world, 
as well as generational strains throughout the postwar West — took 
diff erentiation to such an extent as to challenge the viability of Atlanti-
cism as both an ideology and a political movement.
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Why did it appear to decline so quickly at midcentury? Why did the 
perception (and reality) of decline coincide with the institutionaliza-
tion of so many elite networks? Was decline more the result of intra-
mural competition or external pressures? Did it come mainly from an 
American preoccupation or a European one? Some answers may be 
found by contrasting well-known images, for example, the footage 
of John F. Kennedy’s 1963 trip to Europe with the anti-Vietnam War 
demonstrations in many European capitals just a few years later. 
They present a striking diff erence in tone and substance, and evoke 
the paradoxes of the Atlantic Community — being at once concrete 
and malleable, robust and fragile. The paradoxes may have been 
less the product of midcentury crisis than the enduring pattern of 
transatlantic politics — one that lasted, arguably, until the 1990s 
when Atlanticism was subsumed or even overtaken by globalization.
The Atlantic Community and the concept of Atlanticism may survive 
in some quarters, or may be resurrected in a new century; but its 
twentieth-century life was a comparably short and intense one. It 
reached a peak in the late 1940s and early 1950s with the maturation 
of the generation that had endured the First World War, then under-
went a series of challenges from the mid-1950s all the way through 
to the early 1980s, before its brief moment of Cold War “triumph.” 
The preponderance of historical attention that has been devoted to 
Atlanticism has focused on these bursts of intensity: the Berlin crises 
that brought Europeans and Americans together; the Marshall Plan 
and the Helsinki Process that set precedents for creative, far-sighted 
diplomacy; the dramas of the European Defense Community, the 
Multilateral Nuclear Force, and the Euromissiles. European histori-
ography has tended to favor such “doomed spasms of spontaneity,” 
as Charles Maier has labeled them for an earlier setting.5
Less attention has been devoted by political historians to the latent 
human fabric — the transatlantic society of activists, civil servants, 
commentators, and ideologues — that sustained the policies and 
their related ideology throughout this period, not merely at its most 
newsworthy moments. A full history of Atlantic society in the twen-
tieth century, less divided by momentous events than tied together 
by concepts, mentalities, and networks, has yet to be written from 
perspectives on both continents. It was the result not only of a 
structural convergence but also of a unique combination — or, as 
a sympathetic astrologer might put it, a fortunate conjunction — of 
political, cultural and generational factors favoring the redeﬁ nition 
5   Maier in Emily Rosenberg, 
ed., A History of the World: 
A World Connecting, 1870–
1945 (Cambridge, MA, 
2012), 162.
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and promotion of an Atlantic civilization. Reconstructing it in time 
through the eyes of its protagonists on both sides of the Atlantic 
therefore ought to begin with a few additional questions: what was at 
the root of a common regional consciousness that went by the name 
of Atlanticism? What sustained it? What counteracted it? And why? 
For Atlanticism was as much a social as an intellectual or ideological 
phenomenon; the actors and institutions that promoted it — as well 
as those that reacted against it — are as historically signiﬁ cant in their 
own right as the policies they promoted. That their ranks included 
both Europeans and Americans is clear, but an understanding of 
which actors mattered most at particular moments, as well as how 
diff erent actors collaborated with or contested one another, is more 
elusive than one might expect.
Atlanticism and Its Rivals: The Emergence of a Concept
The mid-twentieth century was rich in the study of sociology and social 
psychology, from Ludwik Fleck’s collective communication theories 
and Paul Lazarsfeld’s work on public opinion to Karl Deutsch’s insti-
tutional analyses and the sociographic studies of Pierre Bourdieu. Their 
development in the climate of Atlanticism is signiﬁ cant.
It is also no coincidence that Atlanticist discourse has been described 
as a byproduct of the Second World War. Bernard Bailyn has written 
that the Atlantic idea, and the impetus for Atlantic history, arose pre-
cisely at that moment because wartime solidarity led Europeans and 
Americans to explore commonalties.6 It is perhaps also signiﬁ cant 
that Bailyn, before doing his pioneering work in Early American his-
tory, was one of the ﬁ rst Americans of his generation to tout a famil-
iarity with the work of the Annales School.7 Around this time he also 
became the son-in-law of European émigré Lazarsfeld. The social and 
geographical premises of Atlantic history reveal these associations.
Bailyn claimed that a regional consciousness, and a regional his-
tory, originated and were augmented by a crisis of the international 
system. This is hard to dispute, although the chronology could be 
extended back to the previous war and its eff ects on several Atlanti-
cists. Lippmann was a principal draft er of Wilson’s Fourteen Points; 
Streit cut his journalistic teeth in Geneva covering the League of 
Nations. Both men became bitter critics of the failures of the Ver-
sailles Conference and of Wilson, yet they did not abandon their 
progressive passions. To them, Atlanticism came to represent an 
6   Atlantic History: Concept and 
Contours (Cambridge, MA, 
2005). See also Merel Lee-
man’s essay in this volume.
7   See Bernard Bailyn, “Braudel’s 
Geohistory: A Reconsidera-
tion,” Journal of Economic 
History 11 (1951): 277-82; 
Bailyn, “Review Essay,” Jour-
nal of Economic History 37 
(1977): 1028-34.
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agent, or perhaps a reﬁ nement, of Wilsonianism: a more workable, 
pragmatic, and, ultimately, lasting eff ort to transform the nature of 
international politics that, in this case, at least, succeeded in merging 
universal ideals with regional (or local) realities.8 If a regional security 
community could work for the Atlantic as a reiﬁ cation of universal-
ism, then it might work elsewhere, but that was, for the moment, 
beside the point. According to its proponents, the West — then 
referring mainly to the major powers of Western Europe, including 
Britain, and the United States — stood at the vanguard of modern 
history; the Atlanticists’ accomplishment, in other words, was to 
transform universalism and regionalism into complementary rather 
than contending ideologies and realities. A successful Atlantic Com-
munity could become the kernel, hub, or beacon for other communi-
ties or for an ever-larger West, which, by the end of the twentieth 
century, as already noted, became synonymous in some quarters (in 
the richest countries, namely) with globalization. Wilsonianism had 
traveled full circle, from universal to regional and back to universal, 
in a mere seven decades. Even the diplomat George Kennan, who had 
once been one of Wilson’s bitterest critics, declared, sincerely, one 
presumes, at century’s end that the age of Wilson had ﬁ nally come.
To claim that Atlanticism and globalization coincide in theory and in 
practice may strike some people as a roundabout eff ort to rename the 
American century. It is, and it is not; the claim itself has as much to do 
with geopolitics and geoculture as it does with historical periodiza-
tion. The twentieth century, especially its second half, drew America 
and Europe together more than any other two parts of the world. Yet 
the history of Atlanticism is not entirely subsumed within the rise of 
American hegemony. The two are impossible to separate for obvious 
reasons, but they are not historically coterminous, mainly because, 
again, Atlanticism is ecumenical: European voices, interests, and 
attitudes exercised at least as much power and responsibility as 
American ones.
Nevertheless, the literature on Americanization attests to the diffi  -
culty of taking ecumenism at its word: what was one person’s Atlantic 
or global trend was another’s American one.9 Atlanticism moreover 
was not the only form of regionalism to ﬁ ll the century; the doc-
trine of the separate spheres — the aforementioned Old versus 
New — survives.10 Finally, even among Atlanticists, there were con-
tending concepts, the most signiﬁ cant being the distinction between 
community and partnership. The latter, as formulated by Jean Monnet 
8   See Daniel Laqua, ed., 
International Reconﬁ gured: 
Transnational Ideas and 
Movements Between the 
World Wars (London, 
2011), esp. chs. 1, 3, 4, 
and 9.
9   See Akira Iriye, “Globaliza-
tion as Americanization?” 
in The Paradox of a Global 
USA, ed. Nayan Chanda, 
Bruce Mazlish, and Ken-
neth Weisbrode (Stanford 
2007), 31-48; also well-
known works on Ameri-
canization by Richard 
Pells, Reinhold Wagenleit-
ner, Richard Kuisel, and 
Victoria de Grazia.
10  See Robert Kagan, Of 
Paradise and Power: Amer-
ica and Europe in the New 
World Order (New York, 
2004); Ulrich Krotz, “The 
(Beginning of the) End of 
the Political Unity of the 
West? Four Scenarios of 
North Atlantic Futures,” 
European University Insti-
tute Working Papers, 
Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies 31 
(2008).
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and his acolytes both in and out of offi  cial bureaucracies, promoted a 
Euro-American duopoly that they called the dumbbell. To Monnet, 
two strong unions — one in America, the other in Europe — would 
best guarantee the security and prosperity of the West and would 
be superior to a satellite system that featured a single large sphere 
(the United States) orbited by several smaller ones. To such dumbel-
lists — who called themselves “Europeanists” — this planetary image 
was too imbalanced to function well. Worse yet, it appeared to be 
nothing more than a façade that masked an American hegemony 
and subordinated European interests (and European integration) to 
Cold War rivalry. 
The former group who called themselves “Atlanticists” included 
many of Streit’s followers, notably in the UK, the Netherlands, and 
Scandinavia, as well as people who played a role in founding the 
North Atlantic Alliance. These individuals were politicians, diplo-
mats, intellectuals and similar “opinion leaders” (to use Lazars-
feld’s familiar term). They depicted the dumbbell idea as too closely 
resembling an old-fashioned balance of power construct and one that 
threatened the unity of the West. A dumbbell was not a Wilsonian 
community: it was neither an integrated network of concentric circles 
that emanated from somewhere in the mid-Atlantic, nor a union of 
like-minded nations, some small, some large, all committed to the 
greater sum of their parts. Some members of this group also sounded 
like today’s Anglophiles, Euroskeptics, or some combination of the 
two. To them, the Europeanists’ idea was too formal, too static, and 
too risky: if “America” and “Europe” were understood to be on equal 
ends of the dumbbell, then a break in the middle was conceivable. 
Also, if Western Europe was imagined to be one single unit at one 
end, where did this leave the rest of Europe? Was the Soviet bloc 
somewhere else entirely?11
As arcane as debates over dumbbells from the early 1960s can sound, 
they were signiﬁ cant. They mattered to some people like Monnet 
a great deal at the time and therefore ought to be re-examined on 
their own terms. Calling oneself an Atlanticist or a Europeanist, a 
unionist or a dumbellist, had consequences beyond determining 
one’s policy allies, or even which clubs, dinners, boards, or study 
groups one attended — although the best known organizations, like 
Chatham House, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the Foreign 
Policy Association, did not generally exclude one or the other. These 
debates underpinned the structure of the transatlantic relationship 
11  A good summary of the vari-
ous positions may be found 
in the volume edited by Valé-
rie Aubourg, Gérard Bossuat, 
and Giles Scott-Smith, Euro-
pean Community, Atlantic 
Community? Atlantic Com-
munity and Europe 1 (Paris, 
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in important ways. The ﬁ rst was obviously political: what shape 
would the North Atlantic Alliance take? That is to say, what would 
its structure be: federal, confederal, something in between? Would 
the various Western European states deal with the United States 
separately or in unison? If the former, what states would dominate? 
If the latter, what institutions? And where would the European move-
ment ﬁ t? “Atlanticists” argued that a community was superior to an 
alliance or partnership. “Europeanists” argued the opposite, except 
with respect to the European Community. In truth, both sides had 
much in common, including their names: both were Europeanists if 
this term is understood as equivalent to Eurocentrism; and both were 
Atlanticists if by that one means believing in transatlantic collabora-
tion and solidarity. And some, including Monnet at times, sought to 
harmonize more than split the diff erences.
At another level, they raise fundamental questions of culture: Are 
Europeans and Americans more alike than diff erent? Do they share 
a civilization? Or do they merely hold certain interests in common? 
There are many answers to these perennial questions, not all logically 
consistent. The doctrine of the two spheres persisted in the twen-
tieth century, in spite of a certain meeting of the minds, induced, 
at least in part, by the cultural Cold War. De Gaulle liked to speak 
of a second force in the West while others — social democrats, for 
example — championed a Third Way. Even doctrinaire Atlanticists 
like the American diplomat Theodore Achilles (the man who wrote 
much of the North Atlantic Treaty aft er having been mesmerized by 
the writings of Streit) favored closer relations with some European 
nations over others. For them, European integration served as a 
vehicle for bringing about an Atlantic union. For Monnet it was 
the other way around, with permanent peace in Western Europe 
being the most desired end. He was a vigorous supporter of British 
accession to the Common Market but was very skeptical about any 
other path of enlargement. In this view, the viability of the European 
movement and its institutions took precedence over other goals, 
including the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance — although again 
members of each camp, Monnet especially, oft en went out of their 
way to insist that European and transatlantic integration were not 
inherently contradictory. 
Mapping these various orientations serves not only to underscore 
the intellectual and ideological diversity of transatlantic thinking in 
these years but also, and more importantly, to reinforce the composite 
WEISBRODE | UNDERPINNINGS 47
political and cultural nature of the Atlantic project. Atlanticists like 
Achilles made common cause across national lines, sometimes 
against compatriots. If their political imagination was directed at the 
best ways to organize “the West,” it was not only for the purpose of 
prevailing against the Soviet Union but also, and for some like Mon-
net even more so, for the West’s own sake. The interrelationships of 
these various groups also remind one just how tenuous many of them 
were at the time, a realization that becomes less sharp as one moves 
further away from the twentieth century and comes to depict it, or 
at least its second half, as a golden age in relations between Europe 
and America. By contrast, the more carefully one reconstructs it, the 
more fractious and fragile the Atlantic Century appears.
For all that some Europeans were said to turn to the United States 
in postwar desperation, such was conditioned by economic and cul-
tural interpenetration of both societies well before the Second World 
War.12 That this continued aft er the war probably had as much to do 
with the prewar scope and vitality of Atlanticism as it did with any 
inherent rationale for its wartime and postwar continuity. Just as 
transatlantic convergence cannot be divided neatly for comparison 
into prewar and postwar units, neither can convergence be said to 
have proceeded unidirectionally during either period. It does not 
easily advance the image of a more rapidly Americanizing “West.” 
Another reason for this may have been an even broader desire on the 
part of Atlanticists for sociopolitical convergence in both Europe and 
America, not simply involving the representations of the two conti-
nents, but also the aims of political movements — as with the eff ort to 
ﬁ nd a workable arrangement between the interests of democracy and 
welfare, for example. Even a number of Third Way advocates — Tony 
Blair and Joschka Fischer come to mind more recently — have found 
themselves reaching a point of compromise with existing alternatives. 
A similar thing happened with the various proponents of Atlantic 
and European union whereby European integration would take place 
alongside, and for the most part without counteracting, Atlanticism 
and its institutions.
Atlantic Diplomacy: Postwar Generations and the Crisis of the 
1960s
The political narrative of Atlanticism therefore follows a diff erent 
chronology and emphasis from the usual one of war and peace: more 
generational than episodic, more cumulative than cyclical, more 
12  Standard works include 
Frank Costigliola, Awkward 
Dominion: American Political, 
Economic and Cultural Rela-
tions with Europe, 1919-1933 
(Ithaca, NY, 1984); David E. 
Kaiser, Economic Diplomacy 
and the Origins of the Second 
World War: Germany, Britain, 
France, and Eastern Europe 
(Princeton, NJ, 1980); Daniel 
T. Rodgers, Atlantic Crossings: 
Social Politics in a Progressive 
Age (Cambridge, MA, 1998).
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fractious and contested than logical or heroic, no better symbolized, 
perhaps, than by the Berlin Wall, which fell, aft er so many crises, 
in a moment of unplanned cacophony and in the name of greater 
union. To this, one could add another forum for convergence: what 
may be called diplomatic culture. The United States established the 
Foreign Service in 1924, not long aft er the modernization of similar 
organizations in the major powers of Europe. The ﬁ rst corps of pro-
fessional diplomats — who entered by competitive examination and 
were trained and promoted by the standards of a profession — did 
so with an image of Europe in the background; and to many of them 
like the aforementioned Achilles it was a complex mix of identiﬁ ca-
tions ranging from imitation to rivalry. The most capable American 
representatives overseas had traditionally been consuls in Asia and 
Latin America; there were fewer in Europe, and certainly few pro-
fessional diplomats (the consular and diplomatic corps had been 
separate until 1924). That now changed. “New” diplomats sought 
assignments to Europe, where they could interact with counterparts 
whom they deemed the best in the business, yet where, as Americans 
imbued with Wilsonian ideas, they may have quietly felt superior to 
these Europeans (and vice versa). Diplomats ﬂ ourished in Europe 
because early twentieth century Europe was more cosmopolitan than 
most other places, not only because of the trappings of European 
colonialism but also because of the location of the headquarters of 
most international organizations, such that they existed at the time, 
in Europe, namely, in Geneva and Paris. America’s ﬁ rst professional 
diplomats like Joseph Grew, George Kennan, Chip Bohlen, and others 
gained a regional and global consciousness by way of Europe, even 
while insisting, as some but not all of them did, that they off ered an 
alternative, and possibly more imaginative, extra-European outlook 
on the world.13
This is the initial diplomatic setting for Atlanticism. A group of 
prominent Americans in and out of government service (who includ-
ed, besides journalists, foundation offi  cials and bankers) joined 
Europeans to modify the methods of diplomacy with the “legalist-
moralist” innovations that Wilson had advocated. New institutions 
formalized old alignments; laws and norms codiﬁ ed habits, rules, 
and customs; “public opinion” entered the secret corridors of high 
politics. This is the familiar early twentieth-century story. Atlanticism 
off ers a diff erent perspective through which one set of practices did 
not supplant another as much as several adapted and merged over 
time. That the eff ort was regarded as a half-success in response to a 
13  See Waldo Heinrichs, 
American Ambassador: 
Joseph C. Grew and the 
Development of the United 
States Diplomatic Tradition 
(Boston, 1966); and the 
ﬁ rst volume of George 
F. Kennan’s Memoirs 
(Boston, 1967).
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double-failure aft er 1919 (European and American), and that it rep-
resented a deliberate repudiation of isolationist axioms, is relevant 
to understanding the proliferation of transatlantic projects aft er the 
Second World War.14 It corresponded to the life cycle — and cultural 
and political maturation — of an Atlantic generation.
Postwar networks thus built on a transnational practice that by now 
was in fact at least two generations old and reinforced ideological 
and cultural tendencies that had grown progressively fashionable in 
Europe and America.15 Not only does this underscore the view that 
diplomacy is inherently and explicitly cultural but also the role of the 
West as a social and political laboratory throughout the twentieth 
century. On the one hand, as Daniel Rodgers’s work has shown, 
this transfer took place reciprocally, that is, from the experience of 
reformers on each side of the Atlantic back to their own societies. This 
also happened to diplomacy. The United States accepted a European 
project and the ﬁ rst “permanent” defense alliance since American 
independence. Each eff ort advanced the midcentury collective and 
communitarian ethos. It is hard to imagine this having taken place 
without the earlier attempts at cultural and political transmission 
between Europe and America. But once again, it was not a process 
dictated entirely by crises or by cultural aspirations and tendencies 
but also by conscious, promotional eff orts on the part of diplomats 
and political ﬁ gures, intellectuals, and curators of knowledge, as 
well as social and cultural entrepreneurs, including the major private 
foundations, which in many cases possessed a sophisticated under-
standing of ways to promote transatlantic solidarity, from the visual 
and performing arts to the social sciences.16
Cultural attachment may not be the same thing as affi  nity, although 
the two can blur. The important point to acknowledge is the prima 
facie existence of such an attachment and to propose that it had as 
much to do with a mutual desire to help, teach, learn from, and inter-
act as it did with some Americans’ and Europeans’ presumed desire 
to prove to themselves that they had something to teach, learn, and 
share; that they could refashion one another’s measure of prestige; 
and that their own cultures, especially their diplomatic cultures, 
which relied so heavily upon the mutual acknowledgment of such 
prestige, were in mutual transition. In this respect, diplomatic culture 
is similar to others — in technology, production, and politics — where 
the forces of adaptation at once counteract and augment those of 
competition. The stakes for this dual experiment were high. It is 
14  This view is generally con-
sistent with the causation set 
out in recent works such as 
Elizabeth Borgwart’s A New 
Deal for the World: America’s 
Vision for Human Rights 
(Cambridge, MA, 2005); and 
Mark Mazower’s No Enchanted 
Palace: The End of Empire and 
the Ideological Origins of the 
United Nations (Princeton, 
2009).
15  Nancy F. Cott, “Revisiting the 
Transatlantic 1920s: Vincent 
Sheean vs. Malcolm Cowley,” 
American Historical Review 
118, no. 1 (February 2013): 
46-75.
16  See, inter alia, Helke Rausch, 
“Transatlantische Kultur- 
und Gesellschaft sgeschichte – 
deutsche und französische 
‘Amerikanisierung’ in den 
1950er und 60er Jahren im 
Vergleich,” in Dimensionen der 
Kultur- und Gesellschaft sge-
schichte. Festschrift  für Hannes 
Siegrist, ed. Matthias Middell 
(Leipzig, 2007), 122–42; and 
John Krige and Helke Rausch, 
eds., American Foundations 
and the Coproduction of World 
Order in the Twentieth Century 
(Göttingen, 2012).
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tempting to argue that nearly every other transatlantic phenomenon 
relied upon it, for a political breach or all-out cultural war, culminat-
ing in a something resembling a permanent isolationism in America 
and in Europe, would have vitiated a good deal. For this reason, the 
Atlantic era, if one may call it that, was so fraught by fear of failure. It 
was not simply that the Soviets might march all the way to the English 
Channel. It was also that Atlantic convergence was considered an 
important end in itself: as a way to prevent another world war and to 
promote a permanent improvement of social, cultural, and political 
life. In other words, it was a geopolitics in the service of civilizational 
progress. To Monnet, who was reputed to be inspired by the teach-
ings of Teilhard de Chardin, this was part of the collective advance 
of humanity through the enlargement and enhancement of social 
units.17 They were strengthened by expansion, then combination and 
consolidation; human beings could recognize, exploit, and proﬁ t by 
it, or ﬁ ght it. They had been tearing down for half a century; now the 
time had come to rebuild and consolidate. 
Why, then, did this optimism appear to break down so quickly a 
mere decade or so later? Why, by the early 1960s, did the most fer-
vent Atlanticists, Monnet included, come to insist that the whole 
project had lost its way? And why did they advance an alternative 
concept — partnership — that so angered their fellow Atlanticists? 
Why, in other, more prosaic terms, did Atlanticism experience a post-
adolescent and a midlife crisis at more or less the same time? Is a 
generational explanation suffi  cient? That is, had its founders reached 
the age of retirement and muddle-headedness? Had they become 
weary and distracted? Did they fail to imbue their successors with 
the wisdom drawn from two world wars? Or had the concept itself 
grown muddled? Did the prosperity of the mid- to late 1950s force 
a rethinking (or a blurring) of social and political priorities? Did the 
Suez and Algerian crises, and de Gaulle’s return to power, really turn 
the Cold War on its axis from longitudinal to latitudinal, transforming 
an East-West conﬂ ict into a North-South one, as Matthew Connelly 
has argued?18 Or did people just take the passing of a torch to a new 
generation too seriously?
One may never know why the whole world appeared to change on or 
about month X. This is too subjective. More relevant here is the ongo-
ing eff ort by Atlanticists to survive and adapt to new circumstances. 
Most people probably would not have predicted that an Atlantic 
culture, let alone NATO or a European Union, would be alive and 
17  Personal communication 
with Henry Owen, Wash-
ington, DC, 2006.
18  Matthew Connelly, A 
Diplomatic Revolution: 
Algeria’s Fight for Inde-
pendence and the Origins 
of the Post-Cold War Era 
(Oxford, 2002).
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reasonably well by the second decade of the twenty-ﬁ rst century, 
without a Soviet empire next door and with a united Germany inside, and 
certainly not during the dark days of the mid- to late 1960s up through 
1973, the year that Henry Kissinger christened the “year of Europe.”
Atlantic Paradox Revisited: Institutions and a Waning Idea
The problem with the history of a concept is that it rests, ultimately, 
on a reconstruction of motive and motivation, which can never be 
known perfectly. Yet, the historical signiﬁ cance of a geographic com-
munity cannot exist without the beliefs, assumptions, and promo-
tional apparatus behind it.19
The source of “Atlantic-mindedness” was not limited to a passion 
for transatlantic cohesion or consensus. It was not, in other words, 
deﬁ ned exclusively by the ends it promoted but also by its preferred 
means. For lack of a better term, this has been called the “Monnet 
method” aft er one of its originators and its best known practitioner, 
who, one suspects, learned much of it from his early career as a 
cognac salesman in North America. Monnet honed the method back 
in Europe and then re-exported it to the United States.20 He did this 
by the regular convocation of allies and fellow travelers — not exclu-
sively Europeans — in organizations and individually for the purpose 
of lobbying governments to pursue favored policies. Monnet’s vehicle 
was his Action Committee for the United States of Europe, a diverse 
group of voluntary activists that resembled the nineteenth-century 
American associations described so well by Tocqueville. Its main 
activity was to draft  and debate position papers, but its inﬂ uence 
went well beyond them. The language in these papers was repeated 
so oft en and so exhaustively at so many gatherings that it seeped into 
public and private discourse. The method was one of salesmanship 
whose product was political consensus. The strength of the method 
on both sides of the Atlantic has been called into question for its 
lack of popular legitimacy, with some critics going so far as to label 
it dirigiste, even anti-democratic. That is another subject; what mat-
ters here is that nearly all historical treatment of the method focused 
on its role in furthering European integration. The method, in other 
words, has been seen as for, by, and about Europeans in Europe. 
Less acknowledged has been its application to transatlantic relations, 
which, it may be argued, were just as important to Monnet and were 
just as successful a manifestation of the method’s utility, if not more 
so, although again by its means rather than ends.21
19  A good example in this con-
text may be found in Giles 
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Machine? Ernst van der 
Beugel, the Transatlantic 
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matic History,” Inaugural 
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5 October 2009, https://
openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/
handle/1887/19602. 
20  This is described in Pascaline 
Winand, Eisenhower, Kennedy, 
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Europe (New York, 1993); and 
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ment. See also Cliff ord P. 
Hackett, ed., Monnet and the 
Americans: The Father of a 
United Europe and His U.S. 
Supporters (Washington, DC, 
1995); Sherill Brown Wells, 
Jean Monnet: Unconventional 
Statesman (Boulder, CO, 
2011).
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Monnet’s Committee started work aft er the debacle of the European 
Defense Community in the mid-1950s and did not really hit its stride 
until the ﬁ nal few years of the decade. The history of the Monnet 
method is found in the record of this and similar committees during 
the same period. Some resembled policy clubs or quasi-academic 
institutions, the aforementioned Chatham House, and the Council 
on Foreign Relations, which had been founded a generation earlier 
(in 1920 and 1921, respectively) as eff orts to promote the informed 
analysis and advocacy of international aff airs. Others were more like 
typical American voluntary organizations that existed for sharing 
mutual interests and ideas and coordinating pressure on govern-
ments, that is to say, lobbying. Among these were the members of 
the Atlantic Treaty Association, established in each of the NATO 
countries; the Atlantic Union Committee, the American Commit-
tee on United Europe, and the Committee for a Free Europe in the 
US, and subsequently the Atlantic Council of the United States; the 
Bilderberg Group, founded in the Netherlands, the Atlantik-Brücke 
in Germany, Le Cercle and the Atlantic Institute in France. Although 
some of these organizations still exist, most had a comparably short 
lifespan, having reached their peak of inﬂ uence from the late 1950s 
to the early to middle 1960s. Their chronology coincides with two 
countervailing trends: the aforementioned division among transat-
lantic advocates between “Atlanticists” and “Europeanists”; and the 
appeal of other parts of the world — notably Africa and Asia. 
It is easy to overstate the inﬂ uence of policy fads, and in retrospect, 
the period from about 1958 to 1966, which included the Berlin 
and Cuban Missile crises, was hardly moribund in Europe. Many 
Americans continued to be drawn to it (studies of haute couture, 
the popularity of the “art house” cinema, Julia Child, and package 
tours to Europe could be considered here). Back in the U.S. State 
Department, Europe would top the list of priorities for the Parisian-
born Secretary of State, Christian Herter, who did much to repair the 
damage left  behind by his predecessor, John Foster Dulles, in some 
parts of Europe. Upon leaving offi  ce with Eisenhower’s departure 
in 1961, Herter went on to become the ﬁ rst chairman of the Atlantic 
Council of the United States. Herter had devoted much of his public 
career to Europe, from his days as a young member of the team at the 
Paris Peace Conference to his shepherding the Marshall Plan through 
Congress as the head of the Herter Committee. Joining him were 
several like-minded Atlanticists who stood against the tiermondisme 
of the new Kennedy administration; some, like Achilles, who took 
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retirement aft er an unhappy ﬁ nal posting in Peru, went so far as to 
act like sages in semi-offi  cial exile.22 In the United States, the policy 
debate over regions had existed for a long time (and continues), but 
it took on particular signiﬁ cance in the early 1960s because of its 
coincidence with the development of a youth culture and a youth-
driven politics (however transatlantic they may have been), and with 
a certain passion for the non-European world and, eventually, the 
involvement in a very costly war in Vietnam.23
In Europe another thing happened. Europe turned inward. The colo-
nial powers one by one said their farewells to empire; the Common 
Market had been launched and began its long process of dominat-
ing the political and social agendas of many European capitals. In 
spite of their heavy representation in international organizations 
like the IMF, World Bank, OECD, et al., many Europeans took their 
global prerogatives for granted while citing the very globalization 
of these organizations — the OECD, for example, which became 
nominally extra-European aft er supplanting the OEEC — as indica-
tors of Europe’s shrinking world role.24 Paradoxical as this was on a 
number of levels, by the mid-1960s, another transatlantic divergence 
had set in.
The institutionalization of transatlantic advocacy therefore coincided 
with the waning of the Atlantic idea in the heart of federal Europe and 
in Washington little more than a decade aft er it had been launched as 
a postwar project. America and Europe again appeared to be heading 
their separate ways, and the West had begun, once again, to show 
signs of decay. There was the saga over the British entry to the Com-
mon Market and the crisis of the “empty chair” brought on by de 
Gaulle’s refusal to accede to a supranational Europe. The Allies fell 
out over Vietnam and, aft er 1967, the Middle East. De Gaulle took 
the opportunity the previous year to withdraw France from NATO’s 
combined military command and to expel the Alliance from its Paris 
headquarters. The gold and balance of payments crises continued 
to worsen, culminating ﬁ nally in the dramatic scuttling of the Bret-
ton Woods system. In the United States, Achilles and his friends at 
the Atlantic Council came increasingly to sound like the embattled 
defenders of a midcentury fortress. For example, several of them, led 
by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, urged President Lyndon 
Johnson to punish de Gaulle for his 1966 action. Although Johnson 
refused (with good reason, in retrospect) to do it, he did not resist a 
break with the Old Guard, one that almost certainly conditioned their 
22  This is found in Achilles’s 
unpublished memoir, “Fin-
gerprints on History,” cour-
tesy of S. Victor Papacosma.
23  See Thomas A. Schwartz, 
Lyndon Johnson and Europe: 
In the Shadow of Vietnam 
(Cambridge, MA, 2003); and 
recent studies by Martin 
Klimke, Holger Nehring, and 
Benjamin Ziemann.
24  See Giuliano Garavini, Aft er 
Empires: European Integration, 
Decolonization, and the Chal-
lenge from the Global South, 
1957-1986 (Oxford, 2012), 
especially chapters 2 and 4.
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break with him over Vietnam and their withdrawal from public life. 
As they became more strident, their inﬂ uence, even outside govern-
ment, diminished. Yet their institutions and organizations carried on.
At the middle of the 1960s, Atlanticism, and the transatlantic rela-
tionship itself, still demanded consensus, and the appearance of 
consensus, according to this older but feisty generation. It is easy 
to paint it in caricature as nostalgic and petulant. Yet its reaction 
was reﬂ exive and should not have been surprising. This was not the 
ﬁ rst time consensus was seen to be in short supply: the 1950s and 
early 1960s saw a series of political crises — from the post-Korean 
War battle over the Lisbon force goals to the saga of the European 
Defense Community, followed a few years later by the seemingly 
arcane dispute over the Multilateral Nuclear Force. These were more 
apparent than real sagas involving the balance of collective arma-
ment — conventional in the ﬁ rst two instances, nuclear in the third. 
In each, the viability, even survival, of the Alliance was called into 
question, only to be followed by a rethinking and a reaffi  rmation, 
much as President Johnson handled the challenge from de Gaulle, 
on the one hand, and from the dumbellists in his own administra-
tion (like Under Secretary of State George Ball, who also had once 
been Monnet’s lawyer), on the other. The irony here may have been 
lost on some of the more strident members of the Old Guard like 
Acheson and Achilles — Johnson was simply following the pattern 
they had set. For example, he gave a speech in October 1966 that 
ﬁ nessed the contending designs of Atlanticists and Europeanists by 
off ering his own version of a Third Way.25 In it, Johnson sought to 
harmonize an opening to the Eastern bloc amid a lessening of ten-
sions over Europe — that is, a combination of what soon would be 
widely known, respectively, as Ostpolitik and détente — in a formula 
that preﬁ gured the strategic calculus of the second Reagan and Bush 
administrations. For its part, NATO published the Harmel Report in 
1967, which appears in retrospect to be something akin to a Vatican 
II for the Atlantic Alliance. Among other things, it sought to reaffi  rm 
the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty:
The Parties will contribute toward the further development 
of peaceful and friendly international relations by strength-
ening their free institutions, by bringing about a better un-
derstanding of the principles upon which these institutions 
are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and 
25  For background on the 
speech, see Francis M. 
Bator, “Lyndon Johnson 
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well-being. They will seek to eliminate conﬂ ict in their in-
ternational economic policies and will encourage economic 
collaboration between any or all of them.26
The Harmel Report built upon Article 2 in endorsing a policy of 
détente and, in its ﬁ ft eenth point (out of seventeen), noted the 
relationship of the “North Atlantic Treaty area” to the “rest of the 
world.”27 The motivations of the report were apparent — its offi  cial 
title stated the “Future Tasks of the Alliance” — and, in retrospect, 
prescient. The Alliance would evolve into a security community in 
the Wilsonian sense from a permanent defense alliance. This is sug-
gested by the report’s language, along with the notion of acquiring 
a more global role. A couple of decades later, NATO’s mantra had 
become “out of area or out of business.”28 
A Bigger Atlantic: From Regionalism to Globalism
It did not take a trained sociologist to realize that the late 1960s 
were a time of great strain for the Atlantic Alliance and its member 
societies. What was interesting about the counter-reaction this time, 
however, was that it meant less a retrenchment — even a reformist 
retrenchment — than a striking out in new directions. Monnet’s 
Action Committee dissolved in 1975, but both the Atlantic Council 
of the U.S. and the Atlantic Institute began to sponsor studies and 
research committees on matters outside the Atlantic region, notably 
on economics and politics in Northeast Asia, energy and the environ-
ment, and the education of what they called the “successor genera-
tion.” This coincided with the work of other organizations, notably 
the Trilateral Commission, which was founded in 1973. Its mandate 
reﬂ ected the simultaneous eff ort by the Atlantic Council and sister 
organizations to bring Japan into cooperation with the Alliance as 
a quasi-Western power. The Atlantic Institute even contemplated 
removing “Atlantic” from its name as a way to attract more founda-
tion funding but in the end did not — a decision that may have been 
one reason it eventually dissolved in the late 1980s. NATO contrib-
uted to the trend in 1969 with the establishment of the Committee on 
the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS).29 This was at the behest of 
the new Nixon administration and its eff ort to co-opt whatever liber-
als it could, and in this case, the prominent politician and one-time 
academic, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, who oversaw the U.S. contribu-
tion to the Committee and also joined the Nixon administration as 
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How seriously anyone — including Moynihan — took the CCMS is 
open to question. Kissinger, for example, has given it the slightest 
mention in his memoirs.30 Few historians of the 1970s have much 
to say about it. Nevertheless, the CCMS survived for another few 
decades and produced several reports and projects, mainly having 
to do with the protection of the natural environment. They included 
the subjects of disaster relief, aircraft  noise, air and water pollution, 
and “environmental awareness.”31 The range of subjects reminds 
one, again, that NATO is, and to some extent always saw itself to 
be, something more than a military or defense alliance. It is not the 
exclusive embodiment of the Atlantic Community, but it is its best-
known vehicle; and its history, therefore, is suggestive of the evolving 
tone of Atlanticism and of its adherents’ outlook on the future. Most 
of the Atlantic Treaty Association members, for example, sponsor 
educational branches that run student exchanges and other educa-
tional programming, and most are funded either in part or in whole 
by NATO or by national governments, as the North Atlantic Assembly 
of parliamentarians has been since the 1950s. 
To map the patterns of inﬂ uence among NATO and its appendages, as 
well as like-minded organizations and institutions from the Munich 
Conference and the Salzburg Seminar to dozens of smaller ones, 
not to mention multinational corporations, athletic, artistic, and 
other cultural groups, would require a very thick prosopography.32 
To demonstrate the ebb and ﬂ ow in the strength and coherence of 
these groups vis-à-vis Atlanticism is nevertheless important. In doing 
so, one must not lose sight of the underpinnings, particularly if their 
political chronology presents a deceptive picture. Nineteen-sixty-
eight has been portrayed in both historiography and popular culture 
as a seminal moment, a “crack,” as Immanuel Wallerstein once aptly 
described it, in the postwar world system.33 To a large extent this was 
true, or it certainly seemed so to many people who experienced it. But 
in reconstructing the various Atlantic networks one can see the crack 
emerging at least a decade earlier as the elites whose transatlantic 
sensibility took root during the interwar years and whose approach 
to international aff airs, typiﬁ ed by Lippmann’s, was advertised as a 
hardened and more circumscribed variety of Wilsonianism, began 
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to fade. It may have been ironic that this took place as social forces 
began to threaten the stability of interstate relations in precisely 
the manner that Wilson had sought to preempt by inventing a new 
form of diplomacy set against national chauvinism. Perhaps it took 
a good ten years or so for it to open a breach and for the breach to 
take on a domestic character as much as a transnational one. There 
was, by the late 1950s, the onset of a division among Atlanticists and 
a distraction by the “winds of change”; by the early 1960s, one can 
trace these splits to one emerging between offi  cial bureaucracies and 
nongovernmental pressure groups, even within the tiny elite core of 
Atlantic organizations; and by the mid-1960s, one can see the split 
harden into a blatant challenge to the unity of both the Alliance and 
the European movement, and a response by way of such eff orts as 
the CCMS. It would take another ten years or so for the breach to 
be repaired, aft er having grown much worse in the early 1970s and 
reaching its lowest point between 1973 and 1978, then slowly being 
healed again, ironically, some would say, by the debates over Euro-
communism and Euromissiles, and ﬁ nally culminating in 1989 with 
Europe on the cusp of being “whole and free.” 
It would go too far to draw a direct line of causation between each 
and every period: from the interwar eff ort to recast Wilsonianism on 
a regional basis through the episodes of intramural jousting across 
the Atlantic up to the mid- to late 1970s when the region saw a resur-
gence of Wilsonianism in the negotiation and passage of the Helsinki 
Final Act and its subsequent review conferences and civil society proj-
ects. This latter development also was an ironic one, as it happened, 
because it was criticized at the time for being a throwback to the 
geopolitics of the nineteenth century. Both the Helsinki Conference 
and process were heavily European but also saw an important, even 
critical, American contribution, despite deep disagreements between 
some Americans and Europeans over its implementation.34 They were 
followed by one ﬁ nal dramatic expression of self-determination, of an 
appeal to law and morality, and of a redrawing of Europe’s borders, 
in 1989. The process from beginning to end featured ruptures and 
continuities; it was continually broken, then repaired and reinvented, 
at least in the West. Or this is how it appeared at the dawn of the new 
century, not only from the top down through the prism of events, but 
also from the bottom up through the human fabric that connected it.
Much of this story was encapsulated in 1967 by the Harmel Report 
and its attempt to link political consensus, military strength, social 
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stability, and cultural convergence.35 The Atlantic Community had 
survived as the kernel or center of an expanding number of concen-
tric circles, containing more than a few dumbbells. If Atlanticism’s 
crisis, then, was a protracted one linking the passage of generations, 
concepts, and events, its capacity for renewal and reinvention says 
much about the thriving of transnational institutions and organiza-
tions in the twentieth century. That many of these, in turn, originated 
as cultural and social projects immediately before and aft er the First 
World War — a far greater political crisis than most people had ever 
experienced — is signiﬁ cant and deserves further study. 
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